e52f931edb
- Add isSafeRedirectUrl utility to prevent open-redirect vulnerabilities. - Update GET /logout to handle ?redirect=, clear cookies safely, and log audit events. - Create AppLaunchpadPage.tsx using pure Hono SSR JSX for application visibility and SSO launching. - Update GET /dashboard and AuthenticatedLayout.tsx to mount the Launchpad as the default authenticated view with Zero-Knowledge querying. - Add HYBRID_INGRESS_PLAYBOOK.md documentation for Traefik ForwardAuth routing. - Implement exhaustive unit tests in server/main.test.ts for redirect preservation, anomaly logging, and Zero-Knowledge role filtering. Co-authored-by: mrteye <1945243+mrteye@users.noreply.github.com>
131 lines
6.2 KiB
Markdown
131 lines
6.2 KiB
Markdown
# TASK METADATA
|
|
|
|
- **Target Files:** `ui/mod.ts`, `ui/components/AppLaunchpadPage.tsx`,
|
|
`ui/components/AuthenticatedLayout.tsx`, `server/audit.ts`,
|
|
`server/main.test.ts`, `docs/HYBRID_INGRESS_PLAYBOOK.md`
|
|
- **Core Objective:** Implement Central SSO Application Launchpad, Logout
|
|
Return-Path Preservation (`GET /logout?redirect=...`), SIEM Cryptographic
|
|
Merkle Auditing, and Hybrid Ingress Playbook.
|
|
- **Dependencies:** Pure Hono SSR JSX UI system,
|
|
`docs/FORWARDAUTH_REDIRECT_SPEC.md`, `server/auth-session.ts`, RFC 6962 Merkle
|
|
Audit Ledger.
|
|
- **Additional Important Notes:** Must adhere strictly to Zero-Trust
|
|
invisibility (regular users see only granted apps; Global Admins see all apps
|
|
with `[Admin]` badge). Must maintain 100% test coverage with zero regressions
|
|
across WebAuthn, SSS, and RFC 9421.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
### 1. TASK METADATA
|
|
|
|
(Defined in the header block above)
|
|
|
|
### 2. Architectural Considerations & Risks
|
|
|
|
- **Risks & Vulnerabilities:**
|
|
- **Open-Redirect Attacks (CWE-601):** Unvalidated `?redirect=` parameters on
|
|
`GET /logout` present severe phishing attack vectors. All destination
|
|
targets must be strictly validated against the approved domain whitelist
|
|
(`*.atyg.org`, `localhost`, and relative paths).
|
|
- **RBAC Topology Leakage:** Displaying ungranted applications on the
|
|
Launchpad (even in a greyed-out or disabled state) leaks internal network
|
|
topology, microservice hostnames, and organizational tooling to unauthorized
|
|
users. Ungranted apps must be completely invisible to non-admin users.
|
|
- **Session Cookie Domain Duplication:** When logging out, failing to wipe
|
|
both host-scoped and parent wildcard (`.atyg.org`) cookies causes lingering
|
|
session collisions across subdomains.
|
|
- **Cryptographic Audit Gaps:** Failing to log intercepted open-redirect
|
|
attempts deprives security teams of automated anomaly detection during
|
|
phishing campaigns.
|
|
|
|
- **Alternatives & Architecture Decisions:**
|
|
- **Zero-Knowledge Launchpad:** Regular users query `grants` JOIN `apps` to
|
|
view strictly their authorized services. Global Admins
|
|
(`isGlobalAdmin = true`) query `apps` to see all applications annotated with
|
|
an `[Admin]` badge and a 1-click link to the IAM Management Console.
|
|
- **Pure Hono SSR JSX Purity:** In strict adherence to `AGENTS.md`,
|
|
`AppLaunchpadPage.tsx` must be 100% React-free, utilizing lightweight pure
|
|
JSX templates and CSS grid layout matching `Layout.tsx`.
|
|
- **Cryptographic SIEM Auditing:** Explicit audit events (`logout_success`,
|
|
`open_redirect_intercepted`) are appended directly to the RFC 6962 Merkle
|
|
tree ledger and broadcast over Valkey channel `auth:audit:sth`.
|
|
|
|
### 3. Proposed Implementation
|
|
|
|
#### Phase 1: Logout Return-Path Preservation (`GET /logout`)
|
|
|
|
1. **Update `GET /logout` Handler (`ui/mod.ts`):**
|
|
- Extract `redirect` query parameter from the request.
|
|
- Validate target using `isSafeRedirectUrl(redirect)` (allowing `*.atyg.org`,
|
|
`localhost`, and relative paths).
|
|
- **Audit Integration:**
|
|
- If validation fails, log `open_redirect_intercepted` to `audit_records`
|
|
(including client IP, raw URL, and discarded destination), then discard
|
|
the parameter.
|
|
- Upon session deletion in Valkey and PostgreSQL, log `logout_success`.
|
|
- Clear session cookies across both host and parent wildcard domain
|
|
(`getCookieDomain()`).
|
|
- If a valid `redirect` was supplied, redirect to
|
|
`/login?redirect=${encodeURIComponent(safeRedirect)}`, otherwise redirect
|
|
to `/login`.
|
|
|
|
#### Phase 2: Central SSO Application Launchpad (App Switcher)
|
|
|
|
1. **Create Launchpad Component (`ui/components/AppLaunchpadPage.tsx`):**
|
|
- Author a pure Hono SSR JSX page rendering responsive card tiles for
|
|
authorized applications.
|
|
- Each card displays app title, description, domain link
|
|
(`https://<domain>`), role badge (`Admin`, `Operator`, `Viewer`), and
|
|
1-click "Launch" button.
|
|
2. **Mount Launchpad Route (`ui/mod.ts`):**
|
|
- Update `GET /dashboard` to render `AppLaunchpadPage` as the default
|
|
authenticated landing view.
|
|
- Update `ui/components/AuthenticatedLayout.tsx` navigation bar to feature
|
|
"Launchpad" alongside Sessions, Passkeys, and Admin Console.
|
|
3. **Zero-Trust Query Logic (`ui/mod.ts`):**
|
|
- Authenticate session via `getAuthenticatedUser(c)`.
|
|
- Check `isAdmin = await isGlobalAdmin(auth.userId)`.
|
|
- If `isAdmin`: Fetch all apps from `apps` table.
|
|
- Else: Fetch only apps where `grants.user_id = auth.userId`.
|
|
|
|
#### Phase 3: Hybrid Ingress Routing Playbook
|
|
|
|
1. **Author `docs/HYBRID_INGRESS_PLAYBOOK.md`:**
|
|
- Provide concrete reference architectures for consumer applications needing
|
|
hybrid public splash pages alongside protected private cockpits.
|
|
- Detail the dual-routing pattern: Traefik ForwardAuth on `/control-panel`,
|
|
`/ws`, `/api/*` + App/SDK-level SSR hydration on root `/`.
|
|
|
|
#### Phase 4: Strict Additive Security & Regression Audit
|
|
|
|
1. **Pre/Post Hermetic Test Suite Verification:**
|
|
- Execute all 42+ existing unit tests in `server/*.test.ts` and
|
|
`sdk/*.test.ts` to guarantee 0 regressions.
|
|
2. **New Unit Tests (`server/main.test.ts`):**
|
|
- Test `GET /logout` preserves valid `?redirect=https://ed-droid.atyg.org/`
|
|
and redirects to `/login?redirect=...`.
|
|
- Test `GET /logout` intercepts and discards malicious
|
|
`?redirect=https://evil.com`, logging `open_redirect_intercepted`.
|
|
- Test Launchpad Zero-Knowledge query logic (regular user sees only granted
|
|
apps; admin sees all).
|
|
3. **Manual End-to-End QA Checklist (Included in PR Summary):**
|
|
- [ ] WebAuthn PRF extension negotiation (`/api/login/challenge` &
|
|
`/api/register/verify`).
|
|
- [ ] 2-of-3 SSS Wasm memory zeroization and key reconstruction (Scenario A &
|
|
Scenario B).
|
|
- [ ] RFC 9421 Ed25519 signature verification against $O(1)$ Valkey
|
|
fingerprint set.
|
|
4. **Coverage Validation Requirement:**
|
|
- Run
|
|
`deno test -A --unstable-ffi --coverage=cov_profile && deno coverage cov_profile`
|
|
and attach the coverage report to the PR summary.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
### 4. Quality Gates & Verification Checklist
|
|
|
|
- [ ] All 42+ unit tests passing hermetically.
|
|
- [ ] Zero lint warnings (`deno task lint`).
|
|
- [ ] Zero typecheck errors (`deno task check`).
|
|
- [ ] Code formatted with `deno fmt`.
|