auth-yes/server/auth-session.ts

import type { Context } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4";
import { deleteCookie } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4/cookie";
import { sqlWrapper } from "./db.ts";
import { valkey } from "./valkey.ts";

export interface AuthenticatedUser {
  userId: string;
  sessionId: string;
  username: string;
}

export interface AppRecord {
  id: string;
  name: string;
  domain?: string;
  is_public?: boolean;
  bypass_paths?: string[];
  allowed_cidrs?: string[];
}

/**
 * Calculates the wildcard parent cookie domain (e.g. auth.atyg.org -> .atyg.org)
 * to ensure cookies are sent to all subdomains (ed-droid.atyg.org, grafana.atyg.org, etc.).
 */
export function getCookieDomain(customRpId?: string): string | undefined {
  const envDomain = Deno.env.get("COOKIE_DOMAIN");
  if (envDomain) {
    return envDomain.startsWith(".") ? envDomain : `.${envDomain}`;
  }
  const targetId = customRpId || Deno.env.get("RP_ID") || "";
  if (!targetId || !targetId.includes(".") || targetId === "localhost") {
    return undefined;
  }
  const parts = targetId.split(".").filter(Boolean);
  if (parts.length >= 2) {
    return `.${parts.slice(-2).join(".")}`;
  }
  return `.${targetId}`;
}

/**
 * Helper to get authenticated user from session cookie.
 * Checks Valkey cache first, with automatic PostgreSQL sessions table fallback.
 * Iterates through all session_id cookies to prevent Android Chrome cookie shadowing.
 */

/**
 * Extracts all session_id tokens from the Cookie header.
 * Necessary because Chromium Android can send both a host-only and a wildcard cookie simultaneously.
 */
export function extractAllSessionIds(c: Context): string[] {
  const cookieHeader = c.req.header("cookie") || "";
  if (!cookieHeader) return [];
  return [...cookieHeader.matchAll(/(?:^|;\s*)session_id=([^;]+)/g)]
    .map((m) => decodeURIComponent(m[1].trim()))
    .filter(Boolean);
}

export async function getAuthenticatedUser(
  c: Context,
): Promise<AuthenticatedUser | null> {
  const sessionMatches = extractAllSessionIds(c);
  if (sessionMatches.length === 0) return null;

  // Iterate over each candidate session ID
  for (let i = 0; i < sessionMatches.length; i++) {
    const candidateId = sessionMatches[i];

    // 1. Try Valkey cache
    try {
      const sessionDataStr = await valkey.get(candidateId);
      if (sessionDataStr) {
        const sessionData = JSON.parse(sessionDataStr);
        if (sessionData && sessionData.uuid) {
          if (i > 0) {
            // A stale ghost cookie was ahead of this valid one.
            // Attempt to purge the host-only cookie to heal the browser jar.
            deleteCookie(c, "session_id", { path: "/" });
          }
          return {
            userId: sessionData.uuid,
            sessionId: candidateId,
            username: sessionData.username || "",
          };
        }
      }
    } catch (_err) {
      // Valkey cache miss or connection hiccup - fallback to DB
    }

    // 2. Fallback to PostgreSQL sessions table
    try {
      const nowIso = new Date().toISOString();
      const session = await sqlWrapper.sql`
        SELECT s.user_id, s.expires_at, u.username
        FROM sessions s
        JOIN users u ON s.user_id = u.id
        WHERE s.id = ${candidateId} AND s.expires_at > ${nowIso}
      `.then((res: any) => res[0]);

      if (session) {
        const username = session.username || "";
        // Repopulate Valkey in background
        try {
          const ttlSeconds = Math.max(
            1,
            Math.floor(
              (new Date(session.expires_at).getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000,
            ),
          );
          await valkey.setex(
            candidateId,
            ttlSeconds,
            JSON.stringify({ uuid: session.user_id, username }),
          );
        } catch (_e) {}

        if (i > 0) {
          deleteCookie(c, "session_id", { path: "/" });
        }
        return { userId: session.user_id, sessionId: candidateId, username };
      }
    } catch (_err) {
      // Continue to next candidate
    }
  }

  return null;
}

/**
 * Helper to get an application by host.
 * Checks Valkey cache first, falls back to PostgreSQL, and populates Valkey.
 */
export async function getAppByHost(
  host: string,
): Promise<AppRecord | null> {
  const cacheKey = `auth:app_by_host:${host}`;

  // 1. Try Valkey cache
  try {
    const cachedStr = await valkey.get(cacheKey);
    if (cachedStr) {
      return JSON.parse(cachedStr);
    }
  } catch (_err) {
    // Valkey cache miss or connection error
  }

  // 2. Fallback to PostgreSQL
  try {
    // Search by domain first
    let app = await sqlWrapper.sql`
      SELECT id, name, domain, is_public, bypass_paths, allowed_cidrs
      FROM apps WHERE domain = ${host}
    `.then((res: any) => res[0]);

    // Fallback: match name against the first subdomain segment
    if (!app) {
      const subdomain = host.split(".")[0];
      if (subdomain) {
        app = await sqlWrapper.sql`
          SELECT id, name, domain, is_public, bypass_paths, allowed_cidrs
          FROM apps WHERE name = ${subdomain}
        `.then((res: any) => res[0]);
      }
    }

    if (app) {
      // Repopulate Valkey
      try {
        await valkey.setex(cacheKey, 3600, JSON.stringify(app)); // Cache for 1 hour
      } catch (_e) {}
      return app as AppRecord;
    }
  } catch (_err) {
    return null;
  }

  return null;
}

/**
 * Helper to get a user's role grant for a specific app.
 * Checks Valkey cache first, falls back to PostgreSQL, and populates Valkey.
 */
export async function getUserGrant(
  userId: string,
  appId: string,
): Promise<string | null> {
  const cacheKey = `auth:grants:${userId}:${appId}`;

  // 1. Try Valkey cache
  try {
    const cachedRole = await valkey.get(cacheKey);
    if (cachedRole) {
      return cachedRole;
    }
  } catch (_err) {
    // Valkey cache miss or connection error
  }

  // 2. Fallback to PostgreSQL
  try {
    const grant = await sqlWrapper.sql`
      SELECT role FROM grants WHERE user_id = ${userId} AND app_id = ${appId}
    `.then((res: any) => res[0]);

    if (grant && grant.role) {
      // Repopulate Valkey
      try {
        await valkey.setex(cacheKey, 3600, grant.role); // Cache for 1 hour
      } catch (_e) {}
      return grant.role;
    }
  } catch (_err) {
    return null;
  }

  return null;
}

/**
 * Helper to check if user has global admin privileges.
 * Strict check: Requires an explicit 'admin' grant on the Management Console
 * or global role, or is the bootstrap root user.
 */
export async function isGlobalAdmin(userId: string): Promise<boolean> {
  try {
    // Check 1: User has an explicit 'admin' grant for the Auth-Yes Management Console or global app
    const adminGrant = await sqlWrapper.sql`
      SELECT g.id
      FROM grants g
      LEFT JOIN apps a ON g.app_id = a.id
      WHERE g.user_id = ${userId}
        AND g.role = 'admin'
        AND (
          a.spiffe_id = 'spiffe://system.local/auth-yes-management'
          OR a.name = 'Auth-Yes Management Console'
          OR g.app_id IS NULL
        )
    `.then((res: any) => res[0]);

    if (adminGrant) return true;

    // Check 2: First registered user in system fallback
    const firstUser = await sqlWrapper.sql`
      SELECT id FROM users ORDER BY created_at ASC NULLS LAST, username ASC LIMIT 1
    `.then((res: any) => res[0]);

    if (firstUser && firstUser.id === userId) {
      return true;
    }
  } catch (err) {
    console.error("[Auth API] isGlobalAdmin error:", err);
  }

  return false;
}

/**
 * Deterministic fast path prefix matcher for dynamic bypasses
 */
export function isPathBypassed(
  requestPath: string,
  bypassPaths?: string[],
): boolean {
  if (!bypassPaths || bypassPaths.length === 0) return false;

  for (const pattern of bypassPaths) {
    if (pattern === requestPath) return true;
    if (pattern.endsWith("/*")) {
      const prefix = pattern.slice(0, -2); // remove /*
      if (requestPath === prefix || requestPath.startsWith(prefix + "/")) {
        return true;
      }
    }
  }

  return false;
}

/**
 * Pure native Deno bitwise CIDR matcher
 */
export function isIpAllowed(
  clientIp: string,
  allowedCidrs?: string[],
): boolean {
  if (!allowedCidrs || allowedCidrs.length === 0) return false;

  // Basic IP parsing (v4 only for simplicity and speed, or basic v6 check)
  const parseIp4 = (ip: string) => {
    const parts = ip.split(".");
    if (parts.length !== 4) return null;
    return parts.reduce((acc, octet) => (acc << 8) + parseInt(octet, 10), 0) >>>
      0;
  };

  // X-Forwarded-For can contain multiple IPs if chained (e.g., "client, proxy1, proxy2")
  // We extract the first IP (the original client)
  const primaryIp = clientIp.split(",")[0].trim();
  const ipNum = parseIp4(primaryIp);

  for (const cidr of allowedCidrs) {
    const [subnet, maskStr] = cidr.split("/");
    if (!maskStr) {
      if (subnet === primaryIp) return true;
      continue;
    }

    // IPv4 CIDR matching
    if (ipNum !== null && subnet.includes(".")) {
      const subnetNum = parseIp4(subnet);
      if (subnetNum !== null) {
        const maskBits = parseInt(maskStr, 10);
        // Fix for /0 masks to avoid JS bitwise shift 32 overflow masking
        const mask = maskBits === 0
          ? 0
          : ((0xffffffff << (32 - maskBits)) >>> 0);
        if ((ipNum & mask) === (subnetNum & mask)) {
          return true;
        }
      }
    } // Note: To remain zero-dependency and ultra-fast, we are supporting IPv4 CIDR.
    // Full IPv6 CIDR math would be added here if needed, but string equality
    // works for exact IPv6 matches.
    else if (subnet === clientIp) {
      return true;
    }
  }

  return false;
}

/**
 * Validates a given URL to ensure it is safe to redirect to.
 * Allows relative paths, localhost, and *.atyg.org (or custom RP_ID)
 */
export function isSafeRedirectUrl(
  rawUrl: string,
  customDomain?: string,
): boolean {
  if (!rawUrl) return false;
  // 1. Relative paths within the same origin are safe
  if (rawUrl.startsWith("/") && !rawUrl.startsWith("//")) {
    return true;
  }
  try {
    const parsed = new URL(rawUrl);
    const host = parsed.hostname;
    const root = customDomain || Deno.env.get("RP_ID") || "atyg.org";
    const cleanRoot = root.replace(/^\./, "");

    // 2. Allow localhost, exact root match, or subdomains (*.atyg.org)
    if (
      host === "localhost" ||
      host === "atyg.org" ||
      host.endsWith(".atyg.org") ||
      host === cleanRoot ||
      host.endsWith(`.${cleanRoot}`)
    ) {
      return true;
    }
  } catch (_e) {
    return false;
  }
  return false;
}