Extracted domain-specific sub-routers from monolithic `server/routes/admin.ts` and `server/routes/auth.ts` into isolated modules within `server/routes/admin/` and `server/routes/auth/` respectively. The original entry routers were updated to import and assemble these sub-routers without breaking their current HTTP interface or rate limiting/authorization middleware. Testing and linting were run ensuring perfect functionality and 100% test passing score. Co-authored-by: mrteye <1945243+mrteye@users.noreply.github.com>
269 lines
7.9 KiB
TypeScript
269 lines
7.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { Hono } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4";
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import { getCookie, setCookie } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4/cookie";
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import { encodeBase64Url } from "jsr:@std/encoding@1/base64url";
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import {
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generateRegistrationOptions,
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MetadataService,
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verifyRegistrationResponse,
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} from "jsr:@simplewebauthn/server@13";
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import type { RegistrationResponseJSON } from "jsr:@simplewebauthn/server@13";
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import { sqlWrapper } from "../../db.ts";
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import { auditWrapper } from "../../audit.ts";
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import {
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getAuthenticatedUser,
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requirePrimarySession,
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} from "../../auth-session.ts";
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import { getClientIp } from "../../middleware.ts";
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export const passkeysAuthRoutes = new Hono();
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const rpName = "Auth-Yes Identity Provider";
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const rpID = Deno.env.get("RP_ID") ||
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(import.meta.main ? undefined : "localhost");
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const origin = Deno.env.get("ORIGIN") ||
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(import.meta.main ? undefined : "http://localhost");
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const requireHardwareToken = Deno.env.get("REQUIRE_HARDWARE_TOKEN") === "true";
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passkeysAuthRoutes.use("/api/passkeys/*", requirePrimarySession);
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// ---------------------------------------------------------
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// Authenticated Passkey Registration (Adding a new device)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------
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passkeysAuthRoutes.post("/api/passkeys/register/challenge", async (c) => {
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const auth = await getAuthenticatedUser(c);
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if (!auth) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
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const user = await sqlWrapper
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.sql`SELECT username FROM users WHERE id = ${auth.userId}`
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.then((res: any) => res[0]);
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if (!user) return c.json({ error: "User not found" }, 404);
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const userIdBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(auth.userId);
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if (!rpID) throw new Error("rpID is missing");
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const options = await generateRegistrationOptions({
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rpName,
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rpID,
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userName: user.username,
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userID: userIdBytes,
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attestationType: "direct",
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authenticatorSelection: {
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residentKey: "required",
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requireResidentKey: true,
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userVerification: "preferred",
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},
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timeout: 60000,
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});
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setCookie(c, "expected_add_passkey_challenge", options.challenge, {
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: true,
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sameSite: "Lax",
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maxAge: 300,
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});
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return c.json({ options });
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});
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passkeysAuthRoutes.post("/api/passkeys/register/verify", async (c) => {
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const auth = await getAuthenticatedUser(c);
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if (!auth) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
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const { response } = await c.req.json();
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const expectedChallenge = getCookie(c, "expected_add_passkey_challenge");
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if (!expectedChallenge) {
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return c.json({ error: "Missing or expired registration challenge" }, 400);
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}
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if (!origin || !rpID) throw new Error("Missing origin or rpID");
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let verification;
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try {
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verification = await verifyRegistrationResponse({
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response: response as RegistrationResponseJSON,
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expectedChallenge,
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expectedOrigin: origin,
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expectedRPID: rpID,
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requireUserVerification: false,
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});
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} catch (error: any) {
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return c.json({ error: error.message }, 400);
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}
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const { verified, registrationInfo } = verification;
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if (!verified || !registrationInfo) {
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return c.json({ error: "Verification failed" }, 400);
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}
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// Enterprise Allow-List Verification
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const allowlistCount = await sqlWrapper
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.sql`SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM aaguid_allowlist`.then((res: any) =>
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Number(res[0].count)
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);
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if (allowlistCount > 0 && registrationInfo.aaguid) {
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const isAllowed = await sqlWrapper
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.sql`SELECT id FROM aaguid_allowlist WHERE aaguid = ${registrationInfo.aaguid}`
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.then((res: any) => res[0]);
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if (!isAllowed) {
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auditWrapper.auditLog(auth.userId, "failed_attestation_allowlist", null, {
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aaguid: registrationInfo.aaguid,
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}, getClientIp(c));
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return c.json({
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error: "Authenticator AAGUID is not in the enterprise allow-list.",
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}, 403);
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}
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}
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// Optional Strict Hardware Attestation
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if (requireHardwareToken) {
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if (
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!registrationInfo.aaguid ||
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registrationInfo.aaguid === "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
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) {
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auditWrapper.auditLog(
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auth.userId,
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"add_passkey_failed_attestation",
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null,
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{
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reason: "No AAGUID provided",
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},
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getClientIp(c),
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);
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return c.json(
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{ error: "Hardware attestation failed: No AAGUID provided." },
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403,
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);
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}
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let mdsStatement;
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try {
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mdsStatement = await MetadataService.getStatement(
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registrationInfo.aaguid,
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);
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} catch (mdsError) {
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console.warn("[Auth API] MetadataService lookup error:", mdsError);
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}
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if (!mdsStatement) {
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auditWrapper.auditLog(
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auth.userId,
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"add_passkey_failed_attestation",
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null,
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{
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aaguid: registrationInfo.aaguid,
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reason: "AAGUID not found in MDS3",
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},
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getClientIp(c),
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);
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return c.json({
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error:
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`Hardware attestation failed: Authenticator AAGUID (${registrationInfo.aaguid}) not found in FIDO MDS3 blob.`,
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}, 403);
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}
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// @ts-ignore: FIDO MDS3 missing type
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if (mdsStatement.keyProtection?.includes(0x0001)) {
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auditWrapper.auditLog(
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auth.userId,
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"add_passkey_failed_attestation",
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null,
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{
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aaguid: registrationInfo.aaguid,
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reason: "Software passkey detected",
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},
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getClientIp(c),
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);
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return c.json({
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error:
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"Hardware attestation failed: Authenticator is flagged as a software-based passkey.",
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}, 403);
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}
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}
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const credentialID = registrationInfo.credential.id;
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const credentialPublicKey = registrationInfo.credential.publicKey;
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const counter = registrationInfo.credential.counter;
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const base64CredentialID = typeof credentialID === "string"
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? credentialID
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: encodeBase64Url(new Uint8Array(credentialID as unknown as ArrayBuffer));
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const base64PublicKey = encodeBase64Url(
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new Uint8Array(credentialPublicKey as unknown as ArrayBuffer),
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);
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await sqlWrapper.sql`
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INSERT INTO passkeys (user_id, credential_id, public_key, counter)
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VALUES (${auth.userId}, ${base64CredentialID}, ${base64PublicKey}, ${counter})
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`;
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auditWrapper.auditLog(
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auth.userId,
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"passkey_added",
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null,
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null,
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getClientIp(c),
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);
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setCookie(c, "expected_add_passkey_challenge", "", {
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: true,
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sameSite: "Lax",
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maxAge: 0,
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});
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return c.json({ success: true });
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});
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// Get user's registered passkeys
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passkeysAuthRoutes.get("/api/passkeys", async (c) => {
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const auth = await getAuthenticatedUser(c);
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if (!auth) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
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const passkeys = await sqlWrapper.sql`
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SELECT id, counter
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FROM passkeys
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WHERE user_id = ${auth.userId}
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`;
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return c.json({ passkeys });
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});
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// Revoke a specific passkey
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passkeysAuthRoutes.delete("/api/passkeys/:id", async (c) => {
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const auth = await getAuthenticatedUser(c);
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if (!auth) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
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const targetPasskeyId = c.req.param("id");
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// Verify the passkey belongs to the user
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const passkey = await sqlWrapper.sql`
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SELECT id FROM passkeys WHERE id = ${targetPasskeyId} AND user_id = ${auth.userId}
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`.then((res: any) => res[0]);
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if (!passkey) {
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return c.json({ error: "Passkey not found or access denied" }, 404);
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}
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// Prevent deleting the very last passkey to avoid locking out the user
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const passkeyCount = await sqlWrapper.sql`
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SELECT count(*) as count FROM passkeys WHERE user_id = ${auth.userId}
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`.then((res: any) => Number(res[0].count));
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if (passkeyCount <= 1) {
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return c.json({
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error: "Cannot delete your last passkey. Register another one first.",
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}, 400);
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}
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await sqlWrapper.sql`DELETE FROM passkeys WHERE id = ${targetPasskeyId}`;
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auditWrapper.auditLog(auth.userId, "passkey_revoked", null, {
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revoked_passkey_id: targetPasskeyId,
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}, getClientIp(c));
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return c.json({ success: true });
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});
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