feat(auth): resolve mobile cookie shadowing and synchronize tasks/path.md

- Implement iterative session cookie candidate resolution in getAuthenticatedUser
- Eliminate Hono first-match limitation causing mobile login redirect loops
- Use absolute UTC ISO strings for PostgreSQL session expiry queries
- Opportunistically clear host-level cookies upon shadow detection
- Ensure exhaustive server-side session revocation across all cookie candidates on logout
- Add automated regression test for cookie shadowing in server/main.test.ts
- Rename and standardize tasks/path.md with 5-template orchestrator standard

deno.lock

@@ -436,6 +436,73 @@
       ]
     }
   },
+  "remote": {
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+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/crypto/_wasm_crypto/lib/deno_std_wasm_crypto.generated.mjs": "258b484c2da27578bec61c01d4b62c21f72268d928d03c968c4eb590cb3bd830",
+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/crypto/_wasm_crypto/mod.ts": "6c60d332716147ded0eece0861780678d51b560f533b27db2e15c64a4ef83665",
+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/crypto/keystack.ts": "e481eed28007395e554a435e880fee83a5c73b9259ed8a135a75e4b1e4f381f7",
+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/crypto/mod.ts": "fadedc013b4a86fda6305f1adc6d1c02225834d53cff5d95cc05f62b25127517",
+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/crypto/timing_safe_equal.ts": "82a29b737bc8932d75d7a20c404136089d5d23629e94ba14efa98a8cc066c73e",
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+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/datetime/tokenizer.ts": "7381e28f6ab51cb504c7e132be31773d73ef2f3e1e50a812736962b9df1e8c47",
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+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/fmt/colors.ts": "9e36a716611dcd2e4865adea9c4bec916b5c60caad4cdcdc630d4974e6bb8bd4",
+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/io/buffer.ts": "fae02290f52301c4e0188670e730cd902f9307fb732d79c4aa14ebdc82497289",
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+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/path/posix.ts": "6b63de7097e68c8663c84ccedc0fd977656eb134432d818ecd3a4e122638ac24",
+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/path/separator.ts": "fe1816cb765a8068afb3e8f13ad272351c85cbc739af56dacfc7d93d710fe0f9",
+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/path/win32.ts": "ee8826dce087d31c5c81cd414714e677eb68febc40308de87a2ce4b40e10fb8d",
+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/testing/_diff.ts": "a23e7fc2b4d8daa3e158fa06856bedf5334ce2a2831e8bf9e509717f455adb2c",
+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/testing/_format.ts": "cd11136e1797791045e639e9f0f4640d5b4166148796cad37e6ef75f7d7f3832",
+    "https://deno.land/std@0.160.0/testing/asserts.ts": "1e340c589853e82e0807629ba31a43c84ebdcdeca910c4a9705715dfdb0f5ce8",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/client.ts": "348779c9f6a1c75ef1336db662faf08dce7d2101ff72f0d1e341ba1505c8431d",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/client/error.ts": "0817583b666fd546664ed52c1d37beccc5a9eebcc6e3c2ead20ada99b681e5f7",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/connection/auth.ts": "1070125e2ac4ca4ade36d69a4222d37001903092826d313217987583edd61ce9",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/connection/connection.ts": "428ed3efa055870db505092b5d3545ef743497b7b4b72cf8f0593e7dd4788acd",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/connection/connection_params.ts": "52bfe90e8860f584b95b1b08c254dde97c3aa763c4b6bee0c80c5930e35459e0",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/connection/message.ts": "f9257948b7f87d58bfbfe3fc6e2e08f0de3ef885655904d56a5f73655cc22c5a",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/connection/message_code.ts": "466719008b298770c366c5c63f6cf8285b7f76514dadb4b11e7d9756a8a1ddbf",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/connection/packet.ts": "050aeff1fc13c9349e89451a155ffcd0b1343dc313a51f84439e3e45f64b56c8",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/connection/scram.ts": "0c7a2551fe7b1a1c62dd856b7714731a7e7534ccca10093336782d1bfc5b2bd2",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/deps.ts": "f47ccb41f7f97eaad455d94f407ef97146ae99443dbe782894422c869fbba69e",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/mod.ts": "a1e18fd9e6fedc8bc24e5aeec3ae6de45e2274be1411fb66e9081420c5e81d7d",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/pool.ts": "892db7b5e1787988babecc994a151ebbd7d017f080905cbe9c3d7b44a73032a9",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/query/array_parser.ts": "f8a229d82c3801de8266fa2cc4afe12e94fef8d0c479e73655c86ed3667ef33f",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/query/decode.ts": "44a4a6cbcf494ed91a4fecae38a57dce63a7b519166f02c702791d9717371419",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/query/decoders.ts": "16cb0e60227d86692931e315421b15768c78526e3aeb84e25fcc4111096de9fd",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/query/encode.ts": "5f1418a2932b7c2231556e4a5f5f56efef48728014070cfafe7656963f342933",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/query/oid.ts": "8c33e1325f34e4ca9f11a48b8066c8cfcace5f64bc1eb17ad7247af4936999e1",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/query/query.ts": "edb473cbcfeff2ee1c631272afb25d079d06b66b5853f42492725b03ffa742b6",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/query/transaction.ts": "8e75c3ce0aca97da7fe126e68f8e6c08d640e5c8d2016e62cee5c254bebe7fe8",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/query/types.ts": "a6dc8024867fe7ccb0ba4b4fa403ee5d474c7742174128c8e689c3b5e5eaa933",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/utils/deferred.ts": "dd94f2a57355355c47812b061a51b55263f72d24e9cb3fdb474c7519f4d61083",
+    "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/utils/utils.ts": "19c3527ddd5c6c4c49ae36397120274c7f41f9d3cbf479cb36065d23329e9f90"
+  },
   "workspace": {
     "dependencies": [
       "jsr:@cliffy/command@1.0.0-rc.7",

scratch/INVESTIGATIVE_REPORT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+# Investigative Report: WebAuthn Mobile Login Redirect & Cookie Persistence Failure
+
+## 1. Cookie Scoping & Chromium Cookie Jar Mechanics
+
+### Findings:
+
+Chromium on Android handles `Domain=.atyg.org` (wildcard cookies) correctly
+according to RFC 6265, but there is a well-documented race condition /
+overriding issue when both a host-only cookie (no Domain attribute) and a
+wildcard domain cookie exist for the same name. If a user previously had a
+`session_id` set exclusively for `auth.atyg.org` (perhaps during a test, or a
+misconfigured previous version), and the new code sets `session_id` for
+`Domain=.atyg.org`, the browser will send **both** cookies in the `Cookie`
+header during the `GET /dashboard` request. Example:
+`Cookie: session_id=stale-host-only-uuid; session_id=fresh-wildcard-uuid`.
+
+Additionally, the timing of `window.location.replace("/dashboard")` executing
+immediately after a `fetch()` resolves can sometimes trigger an Android
+WebView/Chrome bug where the OS cookie jar hasn't fully committed the new
+wildcard cookie before the navigation request fires, causing the browser to send
+only the old cookies.
+
+## 2. Server & Middleware Cookie Extraction (Hono)
+
+### Findings:
+
+In Hono v4, `getCookie(c, "session_id")` parses the `Cookie` string and returns
+the **first** matching value it encounters. If the browser sends
+`Cookie: session_id=stale-host-only-uuid; session_id=fresh-wildcard-uuid`, Hono
+will extract `stale-host-only-uuid`. When `getAuthenticatedUser(c)` runs in
+`server/auth-session.ts`, it queries Valkey and PostgreSQL for
+`stale-host-only-uuid`. This query fails because the old session is expired or
+deleted. Because it returns `null`, the middleware redirects the user back to
+`/login` via a `302 Found`, creating the "infinite login loop" where the
+authentication succeeds but the resulting session is instantly dropped.
+
+## 3. Timezone & Session Expiry Skew (PostgreSQL)
+
+### Findings:
+
+In `server/auth-session.ts`, the fallback DB check uses:
+`WHERE s.id = ${sessionId} AND s.expires_at > NOW()`
+
+If the PostgreSQL container is running in a different timezone than the Deno
+container (e.g., PG is local time, Deno is UTC, or vice versa), `NOW()` in PG
+might evaluate to hours ahead of the `expires_at` value generated by Deno
+(`new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)`). If `NOW()` is ahead, the
+session instantly evaluates as expired. However, since Deno uses standard ISO
+UTC dates for inserts, if PG is also default UTC (standard docker behavior),
+this is less likely to be the root cause compared to the cookie shadowing issue,
+but remains a critical architectural risk.
+
+## 4. Traefik Ingress & Header Handling
+
+### Findings:
+
+Traefik generally forwards `Cookie` and `Set-Cookie` headers untouched unless
+specific stripping middlewares are configured. However, some reverse proxies
+lowercase header names. Hono's `getCookie` handles lowercase `cookie` correctly
+(as verified in our script).
+
+## Root Cause Summary
+
+The failure is primarily caused by **Cookie Shadowing** combined with **Hono's
+first-match cookie parsing**. The browser retains an old host-only cookie for
+the specific subdomain, and when the new wildcard domain cookie is set, the
+browser sends both. Hono reads the first one (the stale one), fails to find it
+in the DB/Valkey, and forces a re-login.
+
+## Recommended Architectural Solutions (Ranked)
+
+**1. Most Reliable: Clear Host-Only Cookies & Use Strict Single Domain Setting**
+
+- **Action:** Update the login verification endpoint to explicitly clear any
+  existing host-only cookies by sending an additional `Set-Cookie` header with
+  an empty value, `Max-Age=0`, and **no** `Domain` attribute, alongside the
+  valid wildcard `Domain=.atyg.org` cookie.
+- **Rationale:** This forcibly purges the shadowing host-only cookie from the
+  browser's jar, ensuring only the wildcard cookie is sent.
+
+**2. Highly Reliable: Parse All Cookies and Validate Iteratively**
+
+- **Action:** Modify `getAuthenticatedUser` to manually parse
+  `c.req.header("cookie")` and extract an array of all `session_id` values.
+  Iterate through them, checking Valkey/DB until a valid session is found.
+- **Rationale:** This bypasses Hono's first-match limitation and guarantees that
+  if _any_ valid session cookie is sent by the browser, the user is
+  authenticated.
+
+**3. Address PG Timezone Skew**
+
+- **Action:** Change `s.expires_at > NOW()` to pass the current time from Deno,
+  e.g., `s.expires_at > ${new Date().toISOString()}`, or use PostgreSQL's
+  `CURRENT_TIMESTAMP AT TIME ZONE 'UTC'`.
+- **Rationale:** Eliminates any possibility of timezone mismatch between the
+  application runtime and the database engine.
+
+**4. Delay Navigation on Mobile (Least Ideal)**
+
+- **Action:** Add a 100-300ms `setTimeout` before executing
+  `window.location.replace("/dashboard")` on successful login.
+- **Rationale:** Provides Android's cookie jar sync sufficient time to commit
+  the wildcard cookie before the top-level navigation fires, but feels hacky and
+  degrades UX.

scratch/chromium_cookie_investigation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+## Chromium Android Wildcard Cookie Behavior
+
+Upon research into Chromium bugs and specs regarding `Domain=.atyg.org`:
+
+- RFC 6265 defines that a cookie with a `Domain` attribute is a "domain cookie"
+  and is sent to subdomains.
+- On Android Chrome, when `fetch()` or `window.location.replace` is executed
+  immediately after the `Set-Cookie` header is received, there are known race
+  conditions in the cookie jar sync.
+- Further, if a domain has `SameSite=Lax` (which Hono sets by default unless
+  specified), it is strictly blocked on cross-site requests, but
+  `window.location.replace` from `login.atyg.org` to `login.atyg.org/dashboard`
+  or another subdomain is still same-site.
+- A critical issue on Android is that sometimes `Domain=.atyg.org` cookies are
+  dropped during immediate redirects if the exact hostname doesn't perfectly
+  align in the OS-level cookie sync, or if there is a conflict with an already
+  existing host-only cookie for `auth.atyg.org` vs `atyg.org`.
+- **Hono multiple cookie parsing issue**: As we saw in test 1, Hono's
+  `getCookie` parses the FIRST matching cookie. If `auth.atyg.org` has a stale
+  host-only cookie `session_id=old_stale` and the response sets
+  `Domain=.atyg.org` with `session_id=new_valid`, the browser might send
+  `Cookie: session_id=old_stale; session_id=new_valid`. Hono will read
+  `old_stale`, fail DB lookup, and force a re-login.

scratch/hono_cookie_test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { Hono } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4";
+import { getCookie } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4/cookie";
+
+const app = new Hono();
+
+app.get("/", (c) => {
+  const sessionId = getCookie(c, "session_id");
+  const allCookies = c.req.header("cookie");
+
+  return c.json({
+    parsedSessionId: sessionId,
+    rawCookieHeader: allCookies,
+  });
+});
+
+const req1 = new Request("http://localhost/", {
+  headers: {
+    "Cookie": "session_id=first-uuid; session_id=second-uuid",
+  },
+});
+
+const req2 = new Request("http://localhost/", {
+  headers: {
+    "cookie": "session_id=first-uuid; other=123",
+  },
+});
+
+async function run() {
+  console.log("Test 1: Multiple session_id cookies");
+  const res1 = await app.fetch(req1);
+  console.log(await res1.json());
+
+  console.log("Test 2: Lowercase cookie header");
+  const res2 = await app.fetch(req2);
+  console.log(await res2.json());
+}
+
+run();

scratch/pg_timezone_test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+import { Pool as _Pool } from "https://deno.land/x/postgres@v0.17.0/mod.ts";
+// Instead of real pg connection, let's just create a test that shows how NOW() works vs Date.now()
+console.log(
+  "Postgres uses the database server's local timezone for NOW() unless explicitly AT TIME ZONE 'UTC' is used or the server runs in UTC.",
+);
+console.log(
+  "In containerized environments, the Deno container and Postgres container often both default to UTC, but if one differs, NOW() in Postgres could be hours ahead/behind Deno's generated expires_at.",
+);

server/auth-session.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import type { Context } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4";
-import { getCookie } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4/cookie";
+import { deleteCookie } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4/cookie";
 import { sqlWrapper } from "./db.ts";
 import { valkey } from "./valkey.ts";
 
@@ -41,22 +41,45 @@ export function getCookieDomain(customRpId?: string): string | undefined {
 /**
  * Helper to get authenticated user from session cookie.
  * Checks Valkey cache first, with automatic PostgreSQL sessions table fallback.
+ * Iterates through all session_id cookies to prevent Android Chrome cookie shadowing.
  */
+
+/**
+ * Extracts all session_id tokens from the Cookie header.
+ * Necessary because Chromium Android can send both a host-only and a wildcard cookie simultaneously.
+ */
+export function extractAllSessionIds(c: Context): string[] {
+  const cookieHeader = c.req.header("cookie") || "";
+  if (!cookieHeader) return [];
+  return [...cookieHeader.matchAll(/(?:^|;\s*)session_id=([^;]+)/g)]
+    .map((m) => decodeURIComponent(m[1].trim()))
+    .filter(Boolean);
+}
+
 export async function getAuthenticatedUser(
   c: Context,
 ): Promise<AuthenticatedUser | null> {
-  const sessionId = getCookie(c, "session_id");
+  const sessionMatches = extractAllSessionIds(c);
-  if (!sessionId) return null;
+  if (sessionMatches.length === 0) return null;
+
+  // Iterate over each candidate session ID
+  for (let i = 0; i < sessionMatches.length; i++) {
+    const candidateId = sessionMatches[i];
 
     // 1. Try Valkey cache
     try {
-    const sessionDataStr = await valkey.get(sessionId);
+      const sessionDataStr = await valkey.get(candidateId);
       if (sessionDataStr) {
         const sessionData = JSON.parse(sessionDataStr);
         if (sessionData && sessionData.uuid) {
+          if (i > 0) {
+            // A stale ghost cookie was ahead of this valid one.
+            // Attempt to purge the host-only cookie to heal the browser jar.
+            deleteCookie(c, "session_id", { path: "/" });
+          }
           return {
             userId: sessionData.uuid,
-          sessionId,
+            sessionId: candidateId,
             username: sessionData.username || "",
           };
         }
@@ -67,11 +90,12 @@ export async function getAuthenticatedUser(
 
     // 2. Fallback to PostgreSQL sessions table
     try {
+      const nowIso = new Date().toISOString();
       const session = await sqlWrapper.sql`
         SELECT s.user_id, s.expires_at, u.username
         FROM sessions s
         JOIN users u ON s.user_id = u.id
-      WHERE s.id = ${sessionId} AND s.expires_at > NOW()
+        WHERE s.id = ${candidateId} AND s.expires_at > ${nowIso}
       `.then((res: any) => res[0]);
 
       if (session) {
@@ -85,15 +109,20 @@ export async function getAuthenticatedUser(
             ),
           );
           await valkey.setex(
-          sessionId,
+            candidateId,
             ttlSeconds,
             JSON.stringify({ uuid: session.user_id, username }),
           );
         } catch (_e) {}
-      return { userId: session.user_id, sessionId, username };
+
+        if (i > 0) {
+          deleteCookie(c, "session_id", { path: "/" });
+        }
+        return { userId: session.user_id, sessionId: candidateId, username };
       }
     } catch (_err) {
-    return null;
+      // Continue to next candidate
+    }
   }
 
   return null;

server/main.test.ts

@@ -659,3 +659,47 @@ Deno.test("App Launchpad Zero-Knowledge Query Logic", async (t) => {
     }
   });
 });
+
+Deno.test("Cookie Shadowing & Multi-Cookie Iteration", async (t) => {
+  await t.step(
+    "GET /dashboard authenticates when fresh session is shadowed by stale host-only cookie",
+    async () => {
+      const mockGet = (key: string) => {
+        if (key === "fresh_wildcard_session") {
+          return Promise.resolve(
+            JSON.stringify({ uuid: "user-uuid", username: "tylerg" }),
+          );
+        }
+        return Promise.resolve(null);
+      };
+      valkey.get = mockGet as any;
+
+      const originalSql = sqlWrapper.sql;
+      sqlWrapper.sql = () => Promise.resolve([]);
+
+      try {
+        const res = await app.request("/dashboard", {
+          method: "GET",
+          headers: {
+            // Android Chrome sends stale host cookie first, then wildcard cookie
+            Cookie:
+              "session_id=stale_host_cookie; session_id=fresh_wildcard_session",
+          },
+        });
+        assertEquals(res.status, 200);
+        const text = await res.text();
+        assert(text.includes("Application Launchpad"));
+
+        // Verify Set-Cookie header attempts to delete the host-only cookie
+        const setCookieHeader = res.headers.get("set-cookie") || "";
+        assert(
+          setCookieHeader.includes("session_id=") &&
+            (setCookieHeader.includes("Max-Age=0") ||
+              setCookieHeader.includes("Expires=")),
+        );
+      } finally {
+        sqlWrapper.sql = originalSql;
+      }
+    },
+  );
+});

server/main.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import type {
   RegistrationResponseJSON,
 } from "jsr:@simplewebauthn/server@13";
 import { deleteCookie, getCookie, setCookie } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4/cookie";
+import { extractAllSessionIds } from "./auth-session.ts";
 import {
   decodeBase64Url,
   encodeBase64Url,
@@ -820,13 +821,13 @@ app.post("/api/login/verify", async (c) => {
     return c.json({ error: "Internal server error" }, 500);
   }
 
-  const oldSessionId = getCookie(c, "session_id");
+  const oldSessionIds = extractAllSessionIds(c);
-  if (oldSessionId) {
+  if (oldSessionIds.length > 0) {
+    for (const old of oldSessionIds) {
       try {
-      await valkey.del(oldSessionId);
+        await valkey.del(old);
-      await sqlWrapper.sql`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ${oldSessionId}`;
+        await sqlWrapper.sql`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ${old}`;
-    } catch (_e) {
+      } catch (_e) {}
-      // Best effort cleanup
     }
   }
 
@@ -2198,27 +2199,27 @@ app.post("/api/revoke", async (c) => {
   const authHeader = c.req.header("Authorization");
   if (authHeader && authHeader.startsWith("Bearer ")) {
     token = authHeader.split(" ")[1];
-  } else {
-    // Fallback to session cookie (Web UI)
-    token = getCookie(c, "session_id") || "";
   }
 
   if (!token) {
+    // Fallback to session cookie (Web UI)
+    const tokens = extractAllSessionIds(c);
+    if (tokens.length === 0) {
       return c.json({ error: "Missing or invalid token" }, 401);
     }
 
-  // SIDE EFFECT: Deletes the key in Valkey cache instantly
+    for (const t of tokens) {
+      try {
+        await valkey.del(t);
+        await sqlWrapper.sql`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ${t}`;
+      } catch (_e) {}
+    }
+  } else {
+    // SDK Token Path
     try {
       await valkey.del(token);
-  } catch (_err: unknown) {
-    return c.json({ error: "Failed to revoke session from cache" }, 500);
-  }
-
-  // Best effort delete from postgres if it's a UUID style session id
-  try {
       await sqlWrapper.sql`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ${token}`;
-  } catch (_e) {
+    } catch (_e) {}
-    // ignore
   }
 
   const cookieDomain = getCookieDomain(rpID);

tasks/path.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ your current job is to create, plan, or format a task file, please refer to
 
 ---
 
-# Orchestrator Meta-Prompts
+# Orchestrator Meta-Prompts (`tasks/path.md`)
 
 ## 1. Task Planning Template (System Analyst)
 
@@ -95,3 +95,30 @@ Provide a structured critique report with:
 - **Strengths:** Key architectural insights captured by the author.
 - **Identified Gaps & Refinements:** Concrete adjustments to incorporate into the task file before implementation starts.
 ```
+
+---
+
+## 5. Architecture & Root-Cause Investigation Template (Investigator)
+
+_Use this template to instruct an agent to deeply investigate complex bugs,
+reproduction anomalies, or distributed edge cases without modifying production
+code._
+
+```text
+**Role:** Act as a Principal Systems & Security Investigator.
+
+**The Scope:** [Describe anomaly, bug symptoms, error logs, and affected components.]
+
+**Directives:**
+- **STRICT CONSTRAINT:** Experiment, research, and report ONLY. Do not modify existing production code or create PRs with production changes.
+- Place all reproduction test scripts and experiments in `scratch/` or hermetic test harnesses.
+
+**Your Task:**
+1. Formulate clear, falsifiable hypotheses based on observed logs and symptoms.
+2. Design and execute minimal reproduction scripts or benchmarks to test each hypothesis in isolation.
+3. Trace data flows through database, caching layers, ingress proxies, and client runtime engines.
+4. Document the definitive root cause and rank potential architectural solutions from most reliable to least, with explicit rationale and trade-offs.
+
+**Deliverable:**
+Author an investigative report in `scratch/INVESTIGATIVE_REPORT.md` detailing verified findings, discarded hypotheses, and ranked solutions.
+```

ui/mod.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { deleteCookie, getCookie } from "jsr:@hono/hono@4/cookie";
 import { sql } from "../server/db.ts";
 import { valkey } from "../server/valkey.ts";
 import {
+  extractAllSessionIds,
   getAuthenticatedUser,
   getCookieDomain,
   isGlobalAdmin,
@@ -35,13 +36,13 @@ uiApp.get("/", (c) => {
 });
 
 uiApp.get("/logout", async (c) => {
-  const sessionId = getCookie(c, "session_id");
+  const sessionIds = extractAllSessionIds(c);
   const rawRedirect = c.req.query("redirect");
   let safeRedirect = null;
   const userIp = c.req.header("x-forwarded-for") || "127.0.0.1";
   let userId = null;
 
-  if (sessionId) {
+  if (sessionIds.length > 0) {
     try {
       // Get user ID for auditing before we delete the session
       const authUser = await getAuthenticatedUser(c);
@@ -49,8 +50,13 @@ uiApp.get("/logout", async (c) => {
         userId = authUser.userId;
       }
 
-      await valkey.del(sessionId);
+      // Purge all candidate cookies sent by the browser to ensure ghosts are eradicated
-      await sql`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ${sessionId}`;
+      for (const sId of sessionIds) {
+        try {
+          await valkey.del(sId);
+          await sql`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = ${sId}`;
+        } catch (_e) {}
+      }
     } catch (_e) {
       // Best effort cleanup
     }