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# TASK METADATA
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- **Target Files:** `server/routes/auth_forward.ts`, `ui/db_queries.ts`,
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`ui/mod.ts`, `server/routes/events.ts`, `server/tests/forward_auth.test.ts`,
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`server/tests/events.test.ts`
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- **Core Objective:** Implement Phase 1 of the Event & Session Overhaul: Enable
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Traefik ForwardAuth guest ingress for scoped event attendees, bridge session
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custom scopes to the Launchpad UI, and wire audit logging on event seat
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claims.
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- **Dependencies:** None.
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- **Additional Important Notes:** Follow zero-trust default-deny principles for
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ForwardAuth. Guest sessions minting needs to correctly log to the Merkle audit
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ledger for SIEM visibility.
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---
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### 2. Architectural Considerations & Risks
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- **Risks:**
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- **ForwardAuth Security:** Modifying ForwardAuth to accept `guest` accounts
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risks inadvertently allowing guests to access applications they are not
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explicitly scoped for. Strict validation of `auth.customScopes` against the
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requested `appRecord.name` is critical.
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- **Launchpad Leakage:** The `getDashboardApps` query modification must be
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robust. If the UNION query is not correctly structured, it could leak
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visibility of unregistered or unauthorized apps to guests.
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- **Audit Logging Integrity:** Failure to capture the audit events properly
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during the `join` phase would break SIEM visibility. Using the non-blocking
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`auditWrapper.auditLog` is required to avoid impacting user request latency
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while ensuring compliance.
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- **Alternatives:**
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- We considered a bypass in `ui/db_queries.ts` where guests completely skip
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the `grants` JOIN. However, using a `UNION` is structurally superior as it
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seamlessly supports both pure guests and regular active users who might hold
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delegated scoped passes. It provides a unified data retrieval flow.
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### 3. Proposed Implementation
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#### Phase 1: ForwardAuth Guest Ingress (`server/routes/auth_forward.ts`)
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1. **Permit Guest Accounts:** Update the account status validation to allow
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`user.account_status === 'guest'` in addition to `'active'`.
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2. **Custom Scopes Validation:** If the user is a guest (or relying on custom
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scopes), verify that `auth.customScopes` contains the explicit application
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grant (e.g., `app:${appRecord.name}`). If not, return a 403 Forbidden.
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3. **Header Injection:** For guest sessions, compute the scopes to inject into
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`X-Forwarded-Scopes` by taking the comma-joined list of `auth.customScopes`
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(`auth.customScopes.join(",")`). This propagates the app scope (e.g.,
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`app:ed-droid`) and role (e.g., `viewer`) to downstream reverse proxies.
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#### Phase 2: Launchpad App Query (`ui/db_queries.ts` & `ui/mod.ts`)
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1. **Function Signature Update:** Update
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`getDashboardApps(userId: string, isAdmin: boolean, customScopes?: string[])`
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to accept the session's custom scopes.
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2. **UNION Query:** Update the non-admin SQL query to use a `UNION`.
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- The first part queries explicitly granted apps via the `grants` table.
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- The second part parses the provided `customScopes` array to extract allowed
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app names (e.g., stripping the `app:` prefix), querying the `apps` table
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for those matching names, and assigning them a pseudo-role such as
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`"Guest (Viewer)"` (or extracting the role from the scopes if possible).
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3. **UI Integration:** In `ui/mod.ts`, pass `auth.customScopes` from the
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resolved session into `getDashboardApps`.
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#### Phase 3: Join Audit Logging (`server/routes/events.ts`)
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1. **Audit `POST /api/join` (Web):** Immediately after minting the guest
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session, invoke
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`auditWrapper.auditLog(guestUuid, "event_seat_claimed", event.id, { slug: event.slug, name: event.name, seatNumber: event.seats_claimed, method: "web" }, getClientIp(c))`.
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2. **Audit `GET /join/:slug` (CLI):** Similarly, wire
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`auditWrapper.auditLog(guestUuid, "event_seat_claimed", event.id, { slug: event.slug, name: event.name, seatNumber: event.seats_claimed, method: "cli" }, getClientIp(c))`
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into this endpoint before returning the token.
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#### Phase 4: Unit Testing
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1. **ForwardAuth Tests (`server/tests/forward_auth.test.ts`):**
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- Add tests simulating a guest session with an `app:{name}` scope to ensure a
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`200 OK` response with correctly formatted `X-Forwarded-Scopes`.
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- Add tests simulating a guest session without the necessary `app:{name}`
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scope to ensure a `403 Forbidden` response.
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2. **Events Tests (`server/tests/events.test.ts`):**
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- Ensure the `POST /api/join` and `GET /join/:slug` assertions capture the
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`auditLog` spy calls and verify the exact payload (`event_seat_claimed`
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action, `event.id` as resource, correct metadata structure).
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### 1. TASK METADATA
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- **Target Files:** `server/routes/events.ts`, `ui/components/LoginPage.tsx`,
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`ui/components/RegisterPage.tsx`, `ui/components/EventJoinPage.tsx`
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- **Core Objective:** Implement Phase 2 Event Overhaul: Add PIN discovery links,
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normalize input, apply tiered Valkey rate limiting, and implement NAT-safe
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idempotent re-entry on join.
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- **Dependencies:** `server/middleware.ts` (for getClientIp),
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`server/ratelimit.ts` (for rate limiting logic).
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- **Additional Important Notes:** Frontend changes should mirror backend
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normalization. Re-entry must seamlessly return an existing active guest
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session linked to the correct event without incrementing `seats_claimed`.
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---
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### 2. Architectural Considerations & Risks
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- **Risks:**
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- If idempotent re-entry is flawed, returning a mismatched event session could
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allow access to an event a user didn't register for, or incorrectly redirect
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them. We must strictly verify the existing session is a guest session
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belonging to the target event.
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- Rate limiting logic might accidentally block legitimate NAT'ed traffic if
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thresholds are set too low; 5 fail / 3 success per minute per IP should be
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monitored.
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- Normalization on the backend must be implemented securely using robust
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string replacements to prevent SQL injection or unexpected matching
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behaviors, especially with PostgreSQL parameterized queries
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(`sqlWrapper.sql`).
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- **Alternatives:**
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- For normalization, instead of just runtime stripping, we could normalize
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upon creation and store both normalized and display values. However,
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stripping at runtime with `REPLACE(pin_code, '-', '')` and `LOWER(slug)` is
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an acceptable and low-friction approach for our scale.
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- Rate limiting could use sliding window algorithms, but Valkey-backed fixed
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windows via the existing `rateLimitWrapper` are more efficient and standard
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for our stack.
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### 3. Proposed Implementation
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#### Phase 1: Login & Registration Discovery Links
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- **File:** `ui/components/LoginPage.tsx`
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- Add a "Join with PIN" link next to the existing "Register with Invite" in
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the footer links section to ensure unauthenticated users can easily discover
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the join portal.
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- **File:** `ui/components/RegisterPage.tsx`
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- Add a similar "Join with PIN" link to the footer for consistency across
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entry points.
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#### Phase 2: Input Normalization (Frontend & Backend)
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- **File:** `ui/components/EventJoinPage.tsx`
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- Enhance the UI script to tolerate input formatting, naturally handling
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hyphens, spaces, and case differences during submission, providing immediate
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visual feedback without rejecting valid raw input (e.g. `241881` vs
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`241-881`).
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- **File:** `server/routes/events.ts` (`POST /api/join` & `GET /join/:slug`)
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- Strip whitespace, hyphens, and force lowercase on the incoming code on the
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backend (`code.trim().replace(/[-\s]/g, '').toLowerCase()`).
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- Update the `sqlWrapper` query to match normalized inputs:
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`WHERE (LOWER(slug) = ${code} OR REPLACE(pin_code, '-', '') = ${code})`.
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#### Phase 3: Anti-DoS Rate Limiting
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- **File:** `server/routes/events.ts` (`POST /api/join`)
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- Use `getClientIp(c)` from our middleware to determine the client IP address.
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- Mount tiered Valkey rate limits using the keys `ratelimit:join:fail:<ip>`
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(limit: 5 per 60s) and `ratelimit:join:success:<ip>` (limit: 3 per 60s).
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- Apply the rate limiting logic prior to executing any database queries to
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prevent database DoS on brute-force PIN attempts.
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#### Phase 4: NAT-Safe Idempotent Re-entry
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- **File:** `server/routes/events.ts` (`POST /api/join`)
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- Before claiming a seat and generating a new session, check for an existing
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valid user session using `getAuthenticatedUser(c)`.
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- If a valid session exists, query the database to determine if the `user_id`
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is linked to a guest account for the target event (e.g., username matches
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`guest_<event.slug>_%`).
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- If the user is already a guest of this event, bypass the `seats_claimed + 1`
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update and early-return `{ success: true, sessionId, redirectUrl }`, keeping
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the existing session intact.
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@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
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# TASK METADATA
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- **Target Files:** `ui/components/SessionsPage.tsx`,
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`ui/components/sessions/WorkshopDrawer.tsx`,
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`ui/components/sessions/SessionsScript.tsx`
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- **Core Objective:** Overhaul visual hierarchy of `/dashboard/sessions` and
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enforce strict 2-state mutually exclusive rendering in `WorkshopDrawer.tsx`.
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- **Dependencies:** None.
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- **Additional Important Notes:** Must use pure vanilla JavaScript for DOM
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manipulation (no React/framework state). Ensure copy pills trigger accessible
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notifications (aria-live/toast). Fix double emoji bug in JS. Ensure mobile
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title wrapping. All changes must pass `ui/ui_scripts.test.ts`.
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---
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## Architectural Considerations & Risks
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- **Risks:**
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- **DOM Manipulation Regression:** Because this UI operates strictly on
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vanilla JavaScript, changing the layout and grouping DOM elements within new
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containers (like `#eventCreateState` and `#eventHandoffState`) risks
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breaking existing DOM ID bindings in `SessionsScript.tsx` if IDs are changed
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or misplaced. We must strictly preserve all existing DOM IDs.
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- **Test Compatibility:** The client-side scripts are tested via hermetic
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`new Function()` execution in `ui/ui_scripts.test.ts` (`validateJsSyntax`).
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The script modifications must remain structurally valid and strictly avoid
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any unsupported syntax or external framework dependencies.
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- **Mobile Layout Breakage:** When fixing the long titles to wrap correctly,
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we must ensure CSS properties like `word-break: break-word` and
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`overflow-wrap: break-word` don't inadvertently stretch flex containers
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horizontally on small screens.
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- **Alternatives:**
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- The proposed container-based 2-state machine approach for
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`WorkshopDrawer.tsx` is native and robust. It's the most appropriate
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solution given our constraints (no client-side frameworks). Using a
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class-based toggle could also work, but explicit element display
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manipulation is clearer for the specific 2-state requirement.
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## Proposed Implementation
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### 1. Page Hierarchy Update (`ui/components/SessionsPage.tsx`)
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- Relocate the main header block (containing `<h1>Active Sessions & Passes</h1>`
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and the `[ 🔑 Delegate Session ]` button) to be the uppermost visible element
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below the `#status-banner`.
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- Move the `EventCockpitDeck` component to render below the new header block.
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- Keep the `SessionTable` and `SessionDeck` at the bottom.
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### 2. WorkshopDrawer 2-State Machine (`ui/components/sessions/WorkshopDrawer.tsx`)
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- Wrap the initial creation form (`#eventForm`), including inputs, submit
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button, and cancel button, into a new container `div` with
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`id="eventCreateState"`. Default this container to `display: block`.
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- Rename or wrap the `#eventHandoffModal` content into a new container `div`
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with `id="eventHandoffState"`. Default this container to `display: none`.
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- In `#eventHandoffState`, ensure it contains the 3 cards (PIN + /join, Direct
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Link, CLI 1-Liner) and update the final button to be a single "Dismiss"
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button.
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- Ensure `createdEventTitle` has `overflow-wrap: break-word` and
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`word-break: break-word` along with a max-width to allow long titles to wrap
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cleanly on mobile screens.
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### 3. JavaScript Logic Update (`ui/components/sessions/SessionsScript.tsx`)
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- **State Toggling:** Update `handleCreateEvent` so that upon successful
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creation, it sets
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`document.getElementById('eventCreateState').style.display = 'none'` and
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`document.getElementById('eventHandoffState').style.display = 'block'`.
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- **Drawer Reset:** Ensure when the delegate drawer is closed (via
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`closeDelegateDrawer` or the new Dismiss button), the states are reset:
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`#eventCreateState` to block, `#eventHandoffState` to none.
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- **Emoji Fix:** Remove the hardcoded `'🎟️ '` prefix from the event title
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injection line:
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`document.getElementById('createdEventTitle').textContent = ev.name + ' Live!';`
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- **Accessibility / Toast:** Ensure `copyEventHandoff` function already triggers
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`showNotice` (which acts as a toast). Verify ARIA roles for the banner if
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necessary, or just rely on the existing `showNotice` function which is already
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in place.
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### 4. Quality Gates
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- Run Deno tests: `deno test --allow-all` (specifically validating
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`ui/ui_scripts.test.ts`).
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- Run code formatting: `deno fmt`.
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Block a user