docs: author practical playbook and 10 high-ROI use cases in docs/USE_CASES_AND_EFFORT.md
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docs/USE_CASES_AND_EFFORT.md
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docs/USE_CASES_AND_EFFORT.md
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# Auth-Yes — Practical Playbook & High-ROI Use Cases
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**Classification:** System Operations & Integration Guide\
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**Purpose:** Realistic, practical assessment of day-to-day effort across common
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deployment, integration, and administrative scenarios.\
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**Maintained By:** Auth-Yes IAM Architecture Team\
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**Date:** August 2026
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---
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## Executive Overview
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Auth-Yes is engineered to eliminate the operational friction of legacy IAM
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systems (e.g. Keycloak, Okta, Auth0) while delivering mathematical zero-trust
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guarantees. Below is a comprehensive assessment of the **10 core high-ROI
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operational and integration scenarios**.
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```
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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ EFFORT & COMPLEXITY MATRIX │
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├────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────┬────────────────────────┤
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│ # │ Scenario / Use Case │ Difficulty Level │ Time / Code Required │
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├────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┼────────────────────────┤
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│ 1 │ Appliance Setup & Cold Boot │ Low (Zero-Touch) │ 1 Command / < 2 min │
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│ 2 │ Tier 1 Ingress Auth (Grafana, Portainer, etc.) │ Minimal │ 3 Traefik Docker labels│
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│ 3 │ Tier 2 Custom Web/SSR Apps (ed-droid, Next.js) │ Minimal │ 2 Lines of Code │
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│ 4 │ Headless Edge Daemons & IoT (RFC 9421 Sigs) │ Low │ HTTP Signature Headers │
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│ 5 │ Internal Workload Mesh (mTLS & SPIFFE FFI) │ Minimal │ Auto-injected SVIDs │
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│ 6 │ Live Telemetry & WebSockets (Ghost Cockpit) │ Minimal │ 1 Middleware Guard │
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│ 7 │ Lost Device Recovery (2-of-3 SSS / BIP-39) │ Zero Admin Toil │ Self-Service UI │
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│ 8 │ Incident Response & Fleet-Wide Revocation │ Low │ 1-Click / < 30µs Mesh │
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│ 9 │ Multi-App RBAC & Scope Provisioning │ Low │ Simple Web UI Form │
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│ 10 │ Cryptographic Compliance & Audit Verification │ Zero │ Automated Merkle Logs │
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└────┴─────────────────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────┴────────────────────────┘
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```
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---
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### Use Case 1: Setting Up the Auth System from Scratch
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- **Difficulty Level:** **Low (Near Zero-Touch / < 2 Minutes)**
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- **What you actually have to do:**
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1. Run `deno task setup` (generates `infra/stack.env` with cryptographically
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secure random secrets).
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2. Run `docker compose -f infra/compose.yml up -d`.
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3. Navigate to `https://auth.atyg.org/register` in your browser and register
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your first WebAuthn passkey (touch your YubiKey / Touch ID).
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- **Why it's painless:**
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- The database schema (`users`, `apps`, `grants`, `passkeys`, `audit_ledger`)
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auto-migrates idempotently on first boot.
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- The first registered user automatically becomes the **Global Admin**
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(`isGlobalAdmin`). You never have to manually run SQL scripts to bootstrap
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admin access.
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---
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### Use Case 2: Adding Auth to Tier 1 Off-the-Shelf Apps (Grafana, Portainer, PGAdmin, etc.)
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- **Difficulty Level:** **Minimal (Zero Code / 3 Docker Labels)**
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- **What you actually have to do:**
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- Add the Traefik ForwardAuth middleware label to your container's
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`compose.yml`:
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```yaml
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services:
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grafana:
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image: grafana/grafana:latest
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labels:
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- "traefik.enable=true"
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- "traefik.http.routers.grafana.rule=Host(`grafana.atyg.org`)"
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- "traefik.http.routers.grafana.middlewares=authyes-forwardauth@docker"
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```
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- **Why it's painless:**
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- Traefik intercepts unauthenticated requests at the network edge in $<1$ms
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before traffic reaches the container.
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- Auth-Yes validates the wildcard session cookie and injects
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`X-Forwarded-User: alice` downstream so Grafana automatically logs the user
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into their profile.
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---
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### Use Case 3: Adding Auth to Tier 2 Custom Web/SSR Apps (ed-droid, Hono, Next.js, Remix)
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- **Difficulty Level:** **Minimal (2 Lines of Code)**
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- **What you actually have to do:**
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- **Option A (Instant Ingress Hydration on first SSR byte):**
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```typescript
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// Read the injected grant vector directly from the initial request:
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const userId = req.headers["x-forwarded-user-id"];
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const scopes = req.headers["x-forwarded-scopes"]?.split(",") || [];
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```
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- **Option B (In-App SDK Route Guard with sub-30µs memory cache):**
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```typescript
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import { authMiddleware, requireScope } from "@auth-yes/sdk/hono";
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app.use("/admin/*", authMiddleware(authSdk), requireScope("admin"));
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```
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- **Why it's painless:**
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- ForwardAuth injects pre-evaluated user identity and RBAC grants at the edge
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for instant SSR UI hydration.
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- In-app SDK verification leverages Valkey 8 RESP3 client tracking, validating
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tokens in local RAM in $<30\mu s$ without database round-trips.
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---
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### Use Case 4: Headless Edge Daemons & IoT Device Authentication
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- **Difficulty Level:** **Low (RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures)**
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- **What you actually have to do:**
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- Register the edge node's Ed25519 public key once via the admin API:
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```bash
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curl -X POST https://auth.atyg.org/api/admin/hwk \
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-H "Cookie: session_id=..." \
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-d '{"jwk":{"kty":"OKP","crv":"Ed25519","x":"..."}, "name":"telemetry-drone-01"}'
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```
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- Edge devices send signed HTTP requests with `Signature-Input` and
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`Signature` headers.
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- **Why it's painless:**
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- Eliminates fragile static API tokens and shared secrets.
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- Signatures survive proxy TLS termination and are validated in $<5\mu s$ via
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Valkey $O(1)$ fingerprint set checks (`SISMEMBER auth:hwk:fingerprints`).
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---
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### Use Case 5: Zero-Touch Internal Microservice mTLS & SPIFFE Mesh
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- **Difficulty Level:** **Minimal (Zero Manual Certificate Management)**
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- **What you actually have to do:**
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- Internal backend daemons query the local SPIRE agent over a UNIX domain
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socket via `spire_ffi`.
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- The SDK automatically validates the client's SPIFFE ID (e.g.
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`spiffe://atyg.org/ed-droid`) against the authorized application registry.
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- **Why it's painless:**
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- Native Rust FFI crate (`spire_ffi`) handles short-lived X.509 SVID rotation
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in the background every 60 minutes.
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- No manual PKI root management, zero CA expiration panics, and zero hardcoded
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mTLS secrets.
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---
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### Use Case 6: Live Telemetry & WebSockets (The Ghost Cockpit Protocol)
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- **Difficulty Level:** **Minimal (1 Middleware Guard in Hono)**
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- **What you actually have to do:**
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- Wrap your WebSocket endpoint with the session guard in `sdk/hono.ts`:
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```typescript
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app.get(
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"/ws/telemetry",
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upgradeWebSocket((c) => {
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const token = getCookie(c, "session_id");
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const guard = createWebSocketGuard(authSdk, token);
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return {
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...guard.handlers,
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onMessage(event, ws) {
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// Process telemetry data stream
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},
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};
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}),
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);
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```
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- **Why it's painless:**
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- When a session expires or is revoked, the SDK sends
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`{ "type": "AUTH_REVOKED", "reason": "SESSION_EXPIRED" }` and cleanly closes
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the socket.
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- The frontend freezes UI state in memory, triggers an ambient WebAuthn
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prompt, and seamlessly resumes telemetry without refreshing the page or
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losing user input.
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---
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### Use Case 7: User Device Loss & Zero-Downgrade Self-Recovery
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- **Difficulty Level:** **Zero Admin Workload (Cryptographic Self-Service)**
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- **What you actually have to do:**
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- **User Action:** The user visits `https://auth.atyg.org/recover`, types
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their 12-word BIP-39 recovery voucher, enters their recovery PIN, and
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touches their new replacement YubiKey or phone.
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- **Admin Action:** None.
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- **Why it's painless:**
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- Uses the **2-of-3 Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS) Matrix**:
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- _Share 1 (Device Share):_ Stored in browser IndexedDB, encrypted by
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WebAuthn PRF.
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- _Share 2 (Hot Share):_ Stored in server PostgreSQL, encrypted with
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Argon2id ($t=12, m=64\,\text{MiB}$).
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- _Share 3 (Cold Voucher):_ Printed 12-word phrase given to user during
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onboarding.
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- Combining any 2 shares reconstructs the master secret in client memory to
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enroll a new passkey.
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- Eliminates insecure SMS/email reset backdoors and relieves admins of manual
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account unlock tickets.
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---
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### Use Case 8: Incident Response & Fleet-Wide Session Revocation
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- **Difficulty Level:** **Low (1-Click / Sub-30µs Mesh Invalidation)**
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- **What you actually have to do:**
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- Click **"Revoke All Sessions"** for a compromised user or token in the
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Auth-Yes management dashboard.
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- **Why it's painless:**
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- Valkey 8 RESP3 `BCAST` push tracking broadcasts invalidations across all
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backend nodes and edge proxies in $<30\mu s$.
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- Downstream microservices immediately drop L1 cache entries and sever active
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WebSocket feeds without polling loops or database queries.
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---
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### Use Case 9: Multi-App RBAC & Scope Provisioning
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- **Difficulty Level:** **Low (Web UI Management or Invite Codes)**
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- **What you actually have to do:**
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- **Option A (Admin Console):** Select User $\rightarrow$ Select Application
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$\rightarrow$ Assign Role (`admin`, `operator`, `viewer`).
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- **Option B (Automated Onboarding Invite):** Generate a pre-scoped invite
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link:
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```bash
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curl -X POST https://auth.atyg.org/api/admin/invites/create \
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-H "Cookie: session_id=..." \
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-d '{"appId":"...", "role":"operator", "maxUses":1, "autoActivate":true}'
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```
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- **Why it's painless:**
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- New users redeeming the invite link automatically enroll their passkey and
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are provisioned with the exact role and scopes for that application.
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---
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### Use Case 10: Cryptographic Compliance & Tamper-Evident Audit Logging
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- **Difficulty Level:** **Zero Operational Overhead (Append-Only RFC 6962
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Ledgers)**
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- **What you actually have to do:**
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- Auditors query the cryptographically sealed audit ledger:
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```bash
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curl https://auth.atyg.org/api/admin/audit/verify \
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-H "Cookie: session_id=..."
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```
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- **Why it's painless:**
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- Every login, invite redemption, scope grant, and session revocation is
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hashed into an append-only RFC 6962 Merkle Tree.
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- Produces Signed Tree Heads (STHs) and mathematical inclusion proofs. Even an
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adversary with direct `root` access to the PostgreSQL database cannot alter
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past audit logs without cryptographic detection.
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