diff --git a/tasks/new/2026-0826.01.jul.story.events.phase-1-guest-ingress-1400.md b/tasks/new/2026-0826.01.jul.story.events.phase-1-guest-ingress-1400.md
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+# TASK METADATA
+
+- **Target Files:** `server/routes/auth_forward.ts`, `ui/db_queries.ts`,
+  `ui/mod.ts`, `server/routes/events.ts`, `server/tests/forward_auth.test.ts`,
+  `server/tests/events.test.ts`
+- **Core Objective:** Implement Phase 1 of the Event & Session Overhaul: Enable
+  Traefik ForwardAuth guest ingress for scoped event attendees, bridge session
+  custom scopes to the Launchpad UI, and wire audit logging on event seat
+  claims.
+- **Dependencies:** None.
+- **Additional Important Notes:** Follow zero-trust default-deny principles for
+  ForwardAuth. Guest sessions minting needs to correctly log to the Merkle audit
+  ledger for SIEM visibility.
+
+---
+
+### 2. Architectural Considerations & Risks
+
+- **Risks:**
+  - **ForwardAuth Security:** Modifying ForwardAuth to accept `guest` accounts
+    risks inadvertently allowing guests to access applications they are not
+    explicitly scoped for. Strict validation of `auth.customScopes` against the
+    requested `appRecord.name` is critical.
+  - **Launchpad Leakage:** The `getDashboardApps` query modification must be
+    robust. If the UNION query is not correctly structured, it could leak
+    visibility of unregistered or unauthorized apps to guests.
+  - **Audit Logging Integrity:** Failure to capture the audit events properly
+    during the `join` phase would break SIEM visibility. Using the non-blocking
+    `auditWrapper.auditLog` is required to avoid impacting user request latency
+    while ensuring compliance.
+
+- **Alternatives:**
+  - We considered a bypass in `ui/db_queries.ts` where guests completely skip
+    the `grants` JOIN. However, using a `UNION` is structurally superior as it
+    seamlessly supports both pure guests and regular active users who might hold
+    delegated scoped passes. It provides a unified data retrieval flow.
+
+### 3. Proposed Implementation
+
+#### Phase 1: ForwardAuth Guest Ingress (`server/routes/auth_forward.ts`)
+
+1. **Permit Guest Accounts:** Update the account status validation to allow
+   `user.account_status === 'guest'` in addition to `'active'`.
+2. **Custom Scopes Validation:** If the user is a guest (or relying on custom
+   scopes), verify that `auth.customScopes` contains the explicit application
+   grant (e.g., `app:${appRecord.name}`). If not, return a 403 Forbidden.
+3. **Header Injection:** For guest sessions, compute the scopes to inject into
+   `X-Forwarded-Scopes` by taking the comma-joined list of `auth.customScopes`
+   (`auth.customScopes.join(",")`). This propagates the app scope (e.g.,
+   `app:ed-droid`) and role (e.g., `viewer`) to downstream reverse proxies.
+
+#### Phase 2: Launchpad App Query (`ui/db_queries.ts` & `ui/mod.ts`)
+
+1. **Function Signature Update:** Update
+   `getDashboardApps(userId: string, isAdmin: boolean, customScopes?: string[])`
+   to accept the session's custom scopes.
+2. **UNION Query:** Update the non-admin SQL query to use a `UNION`.
+   - The first part queries explicitly granted apps via the `grants` table.
+   - The second part parses the provided `customScopes` array to extract allowed
+     app names (e.g., stripping the `app:` prefix), querying the `apps` table
+     for those matching names, and assigning them a pseudo-role such as
+     `"Guest (Viewer)"` (or extracting the role from the scopes if possible).
+3. **UI Integration:** In `ui/mod.ts`, pass `auth.customScopes` from the
+   resolved session into `getDashboardApps`.
+
+#### Phase 3: Join Audit Logging (`server/routes/events.ts`)
+
+1. **Audit `POST /api/join` (Web):** Immediately after minting the guest
+   session, invoke
+   `auditWrapper.auditLog(guestUuid, "event_seat_claimed", event.id, { slug: event.slug, name: event.name, seatNumber: event.seats_claimed, method: "web" }, getClientIp(c))`.
+2. **Audit `GET /join/:slug` (CLI):** Similarly, wire
+   `auditWrapper.auditLog(guestUuid, "event_seat_claimed", event.id, { slug: event.slug, name: event.name, seatNumber: event.seats_claimed, method: "cli" }, getClientIp(c))`
+   into this endpoint before returning the token.
+
+#### Phase 4: Unit Testing
+
+1. **ForwardAuth Tests (`server/tests/forward_auth.test.ts`):**
+   - Add tests simulating a guest session with an `app:{name}` scope to ensure a
+     `200 OK` response with correctly formatted `X-Forwarded-Scopes`.
+   - Add tests simulating a guest session without the necessary `app:{name}`
+     scope to ensure a `403 Forbidden` response.
+2. **Events Tests (`server/tests/events.test.ts`):**
+   - Ensure the `POST /api/join` and `GET /join/:slug` assertions capture the
+     `auditLog` spy calls and verify the exact payload (`event_seat_claimed`
+     action, `event.id` as resource, correct metadata structure).